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The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational
neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on
brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has
puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in
which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place
simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a
mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the
different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-
causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating
within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient (e.g., mental) properties to
be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less
emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different
in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to
argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of
explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a
way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive
physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to
understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic
levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the
different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to
understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of
the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental
disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be
more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders.
Keywords: psychiatry, the mind-brain problem, causality, neuronal networks, neural computation, philosophy of
mind, computational neuroscience of mind, consciousness
INTRODUCTION
The relation between events at different levels, such as the sub-neuronal, neuronal, neuronal
network, and even mental levels is important for computational neuroscience. How does
causality operate in such a system? What is the relation between brain events and mental
events?
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Philosophers have long been thinking about the relation
between the mind and the brain. Descartes took a dualist
approach (Descartes, 1644), and that raised the problem of how
the mind and brain relate to each other.
Searle (1992) had a clear opinion: “It seems to me obvious
from everything we know about the brain that macro mental
phenomena are all caused by lower-level micro phenomena.
There is nothing mysterious about such bottom-up causation: it
is quite common in the physical world. Furthermore, the fact that
mental features are supervenient on neuronal features in no way
diminishes their causal efficacy. The solidity of a piston is causally
supervenient on its molecular structure, but this does not make
solidity epiphenomenal; and similarly, the causal supervenient
of my present back pain on micro events in my brain does not
make the pain epiphenomenal. My conclusion is that once you
recognise the existence of bottom-up, micro to macro forms
of causation, the notion of supervenient no longer does any
work in philosophy.” (Supervenience literally means “coming on
top of,” and specifies conditions that should hold between the
higher level and lower level properties. Supervenience in our case
specifies that a set of mental properties M1 supervenes upon
another (physical) set P1 just in case no two things can differ
with respect to M-properties without also differing with respect
to their P-properties (McLaughlin and Bennett, 2011)).
Starting with an interventionist account of causation
(Woodward, 2005), Baumgartner (2009) in a “causal exclusion”
argument held that the assumption of a supervenience relation
violates the criterion of what counts as a good intervention.
He held that as a result, we cannot draw conclusions about the
causal relation between mental states and brain states. In his
reply to Baumgartner (2009), Woodward (2015) proposed to
adjust these intervention criteria in order to make room for
supervenience relations and to secure causal claims for cognitive
neuroscience investigations (see Dijkstra and De Bruin, 2016).
(The interventionist theory of causality is roughly that C causes
E if and only if an intervention on C would bring about a change
in E. An intervention on C means some manipulation of C that
changes it. C is a variable that can take different states).
The relation between mental events and brain events (Kim,
1998, 2011) is also important in psychiatry (Dijkstra and
De Bruin, 2016). For example, we may find that functional
connectivities between some brain areas are different in
schizophrenia and depression, and are correlated with the
symptoms (Rolls et al., 2020; Rolls, 2021a). Moreover, in some
brain areas, the neural (fMRI BOLD signal) activations to a set of
stimuli are directly correlated with their subjective pleasantness
(Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Rolls, 2018a, 2019, 2021b), and
these reward systems appear to operate abnormally in depression
(Rolls et al., 2020). Another example of the relation between
the brain and the mind is that damage to the orbitofrontal
cortex impairs emotional behavior (Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows,
2011; Rolls, 2019; Rolls et al., 2020) and subjective emotional
experience (Hornak et al., 2003). In these examples, does the
difference in the brain cause the difference in the mental
including subjective states? This is important for treatment, for
it may be useful to know whether a possible treatment might
be to reduce the differences in the brain, using for example,
medication (Rolls, 2021a), and this raises the issue of how the
mental states are changed. Psychiatry is one area in which
developing our understanding of the relation between brain
states and events, and mental states and events, may be useful
(Dijkstra and De Bruin, 2016).
In this paper I develop and explain further a theory of
the relation between events investigated at different levels
of neuroscience (Rolls, 2020). These include ion channels
in neurons activated by transmitters; the action potentials
produced by neurons to transmit information to other neurons;
and the collective activity of large populations of neurons to
perform mental processes such as short-term memory, long-
term memory, decision-making, and emotion. The ways in
which these computations are performed are described elsewhere
(Rolls, 2021b). Here I focus on the relations between the
activity at different levels of these processes. I argue that these
are different levels of explanation, each with their uses. As
a neuroscientist, I argue that we can think of causality as
operating within a level, but not between levels. That is an
important move, and if accepted helps enormously with the great
debates about dualism, functionalism, physical reductionism,
etc. In this paper I reach as far as mental events, but do not
deal with phenomenal consciousness, which I have considered
elsewhere (Rolls, 2004, 2012b, 2020). This is clarified below, but
a mental event as considered here does not include what is
experienced phenomenally (Rolls, 2020); but the mental events
considered here can include events such as perception, memory,
and emotional states that, as shown below, can have content.
LEVELS OF EXPLANATION IN
NEUROSCIENCE, AND THE RELATION
BETWEEN THE MIND AND THE BRAIN
We can now understand brain processing from the level of ion
channels in neurons, through neuronal biophysics, to neuronal
firing, through the computations performed by populations
of neurons, and how their activity is reflected by functional
neuroimaging, to behavioral and cognitive effects (Rolls, 2016b,
2021b). Activity at any one level can be used to understand
activity at the next. This raises the philosophical issue of how we
should consider causality with these different levels (Rolls, 2016b,
2020, 2021b). Does the brain cause effects in the mind, and do
events at the mental, mind, level cause brain activity?
What is the relation between the mind and the brain? This is
the mind-brain or mind-body problem. Do mental, mind, events
cause brain events? Do brain events cause mental effects? What
can we learn from the relation between software and hardware
in a computer about mind-brain interactions and how causality
operates?
Some have argued that phenomenal consciousness can be
reduced to a natural (physical or physically realized) property
(Carruthers, 2019). This, for him, takes much of the mystery out
of phenomenal consciousness, for it is just a matter of matter, and
simplifies his approach to all the questions raised by phenomenal
consciousness. But is it reasonable to argue that one can reduce
what is at a very high level in the processing system to the physical
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properties that implement the processing at a lower level? I do
not think so. To make this point, we need to consider how
different levels of the system, such as the neuronal level and the
computational function being performed, relate to each other.
This is part of the very big problem of the relation between the
mind and the brain. Here is my approach to this.
One possible view that has been described (Rolls, 2016b) is that
the relationship between mental events and neurophysiological
events is similar to the relationship between the program running
in a computer and the hardware of the computer. Does the
program (the software loaded onto the computer usually written
in a high-level language such as C and then compiled into
machine code “cause” the logic gates of the computer hardware
to move to the next state? And does this hardware state change
“cause” the program to move to its next step or state? It would be
helpful if those interested in the philosophy of the “mind-brain”
problem would provide, as a starting point, a clear view on this
computational issue in computers, as that is a well-formulated
problem. Once there is satisfactory explanation here, one is likely
to be in a better position to understand the mind-brain problem.
I propose that one way to think about this is that when we
are looking at different levels of what is overall the operation of
a computational system, causality can usefully be understood as
operating within levels (causing one step of the program to move
to the next; or the neurons to move from one state to another),
but not between levels (e.g., software to hardware and vice versa).
That is, if the events at the different levels of explanation are
occurring simultaneously, without a time delay, then my view is
that we should not think of causality as operating between levels,
but just that what happens at a higher level may be an emergent
property of what happens at a lower level. This is the solution I
propose to this aspect of the mind-brain problem.
Following this thinking, when one step of a process at one level
of explanation moves to the next step in time, we can speak of
causality that would meet the criteria for Granger causality where
one time series, including the time series being considered, can
be used to predict the next step in time (Granger, 1969; Bressler
and Seth, 2011; Ge et al., 2012). In contrast, when we consider
the relationship between processes described at different levels of
explanation, such as the relation between a step in the hardware
in a computer and a step in the software, then these processes
may occur simultaneously, and be inextricably linked with each
other, and just be different ways of describing the same process, so
that temporal (Granger) causality does not apply to this relation
between levels, but only within levels. The whole processing can
now be specified from the mechanistic level of neuronal firings,
etc., up through the computational level to the cognitive and
behavioral level.
Let me develop this further. In neuroscience (and this may
be different from quantum physics), we think that when causes
produce effects a time delay is a useful indicator. For example,
if I present a face to an individual, neurons in the primate
primary visual cortex V1 may start firing within 30–40 ms, in
V2 approximately 15 ms later, in the next stage V4 15 ms later,
in posterior inferior temporal cortex 15 ms later, and in the
anterior inferior temporal after another 15 ms at approximately
90–100 ms after the stimulus is shown (Rolls, 1992, 2021b). I
interpret this, knowing too the anatomical connections in this
serial hierarchy, and the effects of damage to each of the stages,
that the firing in V1 causes the firing in V2 etc., all the way
up to the anterior inferior temporal cortex, where face selective
neurons are found (Perrett et al., 1982; Rolls, 1984). We can
say that a representation of individual faces that is invariant
with respect to size, position and even view has been formed
by the inferior temporal visual cortex (Rolls, 2012a, 2021b).
This is a representation of a face in the world as shown by the
mutual information between the neuronal firing and the face
(Rolls and Treves, 2011; Rolls, 2021b). We can say that this
representation has content (Shea, 2018), because of the effects
that are produced by damage to this region or to regions to which
it projects. For example, damage to the human fusiform face
cortex produces an inability to recognize faces (prosopagnosia);
and damage to the orbitofrontal cortex which receives inputs
from the inferior temporal cortex produces impairments in
face expression identification (Hornak et al., 1996, 2003). So
mental events are involved, in this case related to perception
and emotion. However, what happens within an area such as the
inferior temporal cortex where the invariant face representation
is formed is that the synaptic inputs are received from the
posterior inferior temporal visual cortex, ion channels in the
neurons are opened, the neurons start to fire action potentials,
and then there is a competition between the excitatory neurons
(pyramidal cells) implemented by feedback inhibition from the
inhibitory neurons until a sparse distributed representation of
relatively few neurons firing at relatively high rates is produced
(Rolls, 2021b). This categorization is even helped by recurrent
excitatory connections between the excitatory neurons that help
the population acting as an attractor network to fall into a
representation of one or a different person or object learned
in previous experience (Akrami et al., 2009). This collective
computation performed by populations of neurons can all take
place within 15–20 ms in a cortical area (Panzeri et al., 2001;
Rolls, 2016b, 2021b). The argument is that a computation has
been performed that can be described at the synaptic, neuronal,
and neuron population level, and all happen at the same time and
are accompanied at the same time by what can be described as the
mental process of invariant object recognition, which, as we have
seen, carries content.
Another example of the type of mental state I refer to here is
recall of a whole memory. The theory is that the CA3 neurons
of the hippocampus with their recurrent excitatory associatively
modifiable synaptic connections implement an attractor network
used in the retrieval of the whole of an episodic memory from
any part of it (Rolls, 1989, 2018b, 2021b; Kesner and Rolls, 2015).
The retrieval cue, a small fraction of the original memory, for
example, the place, when the whole episodic memory is about
seeing a person in a particular place, is applied via the perforant
path to the CA3 neurons. This recall cue consists of a subset of
the original perforant path neurons firing. This firing releases
glutamate as a transmitter that opens ion channels in the CA3
neurons for which these synapses are strong. The opening of the
ion channels depolarizes the membrane potentials of these CA3
neurons, and they start to fire action potentials. These action
potentials then activate other CA3 neurons with strong synapses
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that were strengthened because they were coactive during the
learning of the episodic memory originally. So the full pattern of
activity of the CA3 neurons, which will now include the person
who was present at that place originally, starts to be recalled
(Rolls, 2021b). The recall then is a collective computation in
which all the CA3 neurons with strengthened synapses between
them learned during the original episode fall into the optimal
basin of attraction (with inhibitory feedback neurons preventing
this excitatory interaction of the CA3 cells from blowing up with
all the neurons active). This collective computation occurs across
the whole population of neurons in what is termed an attractor
network, and this will find the optimal recall as shown with the
techniques of theoretical physics (Hopfield, 1982; Amit, 1989;
Treves and Rolls, 1994; Rolls, 2021b). This retrieval of a full
memory in the hippocampus, and its recall even to the neocortical
areas that originally had neuronal activity during the learning
of the episodic event (Rolls, 1989, 2018b, 2021b; Treves and
Rolls, 1994), is a mental operation, that of the recall of a whole
episodic memory from any part of it. Moreover, this has mental
content (Shea, 2018), in that interference with this hippocampal
process impairs memory (Kesner and Rolls, 2015; Feng et al.,
2020). So we have seen in this example how different levels of
explanation, from ion channels, through neuronal firing, though
the collective computation performed by the whole population
of 300,000 CA3 neurons, can result in the correct recall of any
one of approximately 10,000 memories [values for the rat (Treves
and Rolls, 1994; Rolls, 2021b)]. The so-called “emergent” events
of full memory recall at the level of the whole population of
neurons (Hopfield, 1982), which is a mental or mind-level event,
can best be understood at the level of explanation of the collective
properties of the whole neuronal population operating in the way
described; but supervene on the lower levels such as the firing
of individual neurons. The neurons step in time from one subset
firing to another until the full set is complete, with causality at this
level; and the mental state moves from an incomplete recall cue
to a full memory being present, with again causality operating at
this level. The collective computation is related to the firing of the
neurons, and is different in kind to the firing of the neurons. So
what occurs at the different levels of explanation can be described
as supervenience of one level on another, with causality operating
across time within a level but not between levels, because the
mental and neuronal processes occur at the same time.
Timing and its relation to causality do seem relevant to this
discussion, so it may be helpful to consider what happens in a
computer in a little more detail when a program runs from one
step to another in the computer. At the program level, we can
assume that one step of the compiled program (e.g., add a to b,
i.e., b = b + a) causes a to be added to b. The compiled code
is read by automaton-like operations performed by the Control
Unit (CU) such as copy the contents of memory from where a
is stored to a register in the central arithmetic logic unit (ALU),
copy the contents of memory from where b is stored to a register
in the ALU, perform a logical operation such as ADD with the
operands now in the registers of the ALU, and then with the
CU copy the contents of the ALU back to the memory location
where b is stored. We can say at the machine level that a series
of steps is performed by the CU with each step following each
other in a causal chain. So causality operates within that level.
And at the next level down, within the ALU, logic gates work
together to perform operations such as AND, OR, NOT, and
XOR to then implement the mathematical functions such as
ADD, MULTIPLY, SUBTRACT, and DIVIDE. In this system, the
different levels all happen at the same time: a + b is calculated at
the program level; a and b are fetched at the machine instruction
level; and many operations are performed at the level of logic
gates. But I argue that all these levels happen at the same time,
not in a causal chain up and down between levels, involving time
delays. The program level does not perform a step and then wait
some time for a causal effect to occur in the CU. Instead, the CU
performs its processes of reading the next step from the compiled
program, fetching contents from memory addresses, letting the
ALU operate, and then sending back the result to a memory
address, all of which implements one step at the program level. So
I do not wish to argue for causality between levels, as the timing
does not support that. Thus my view is that we have a system
that operates at different levels of explanation, with causality, and
time, moving forward within each level, but without causality and
time delays between levels. What happens at the different levels
is however locked together, so that one level can be said in a
non-causal sense to be supervenient on the level below.
Of course I accept that causality operates within a level. So a
programmer decides that an algorithm requires a to be added to
b. The programmer then uses a compiler such as C to include this
in a program. The programmer then starts the compiled program
to run by touching a key on the keyboard or moving the mouse
and clicking. So all of these steps are causal, and operate within a
given level of explanation, and serially in time.
Now we can explain what happens in this programming
situation at any level of explanation that we choose: at the level
of the programmer; or of the operation of stepping through the
machine code by the computer CU; or at the level of the logic gate
states that occur in the ALU.
When we describe the operation of the system, it may be
very convenient to describe it at a particular level of explanation
(Dennett, 1991). For example, the easiest way to understand what
is happening in this computer example in terms of causality is
to take the program level, “add a to b” (and not for example at
the logic gate level). But to return to brains: it does matter greatly
that we understand causally what is happening within each level
of operation. For example, if the events at the subjective, mental,
level operate with less stability so that cognitive symptoms arise
in schizophrenia, then it can be very important to know what is
happening at the level of brain connectivity and its implications
for the stability of attractor networks, for this may provide not
only an account for the mental symptoms, but also a way to treat
them (Rolls, 2021a; Rolls et al., 2021).
The view I propose therefore is that different levels of
explanation in at least computers and brains can be related
to each other in a necessary (unique and obligatory) way
(sometimes called supervenience), but that this relationship
need not be causal, with a key argument that there is no time
delay between the different levels of operation and explanation.
There are approaches in philosophy that specify that mechanistic
explanations may help to link levels of a system non-causally but
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“constitutively” (Craver and Bechtel, 2007; Craver and Tabery,
2015), but there has been discussion about what constitutes levels
in those systems being considered (Eronen, 2013). There are
also approaches in philosophy that aim to specify the conditions
under which a physical system performs a computation defined
by a mathematical formalism (Ritchie and Piccinini, 2018).
Mappings between the physical and algorithmic levels are
considered in this “computational implementation” approach,
but the causal properties involved in these “mappings” were not
detailed (Ritchie and Piccinini, 2018). What I have aimed to do
here is to argue that explanations at each level of the system
can be helpful in understanding the system, with causes even
being considered to operate simultaneously at the different levels
(Figure 1); and I have defined the levels at least for neuroscience
at what seem to be clearly separate levels of operation, such as
ion channels in neurons; the firing of neurons which transmits
information to other neurons; the collective operation of large
populations of neurons to fall into, for example, a stable coalition
interpreted as an energy minimum that implements memory
retrieval; and the description at a higher mental level of the
fact that the memory has been recalled and can be reported
(Rolls, 2021b).
Sometimes the cognitive effects that arise from brain
computations (Rolls, 2021b) seem remarkable, for example, the
recall of a whole memory from a part of it, and we describe
this as an “emergent property,” but once understood from
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the relation between physical brain
states (P1 and P2) and mental states (M1 and M2). Undirected edges indicate
supervenience/subvenience relations which apply upward and downward and
are non-causal. The edges with an arrow indicate a causal relation.
the mechanistic level upward, the functions implemented are
elegant and wonderful, but understandable and not magical
or poorly understood (Rolls, 2016b, 2021b). We can say here
that the way in which a discrete attractor network settles by
its collective computation into a low energy basin of attraction
to solve a computational problem is different in kind from a
set of individual neurons firing action potentials, or from the
transmitter being released onto each of the 10,000 synapses in
the typically 100,000 neurons in the cortical attractor network
(Rolls, 2016b, 2021b). In this sense, I do not think that a claim
that all the properties of the system, including its emergent
properties, can be reduced to what might be happening in
noisy ion channels in synapses. Of course, what is happening
simultaneously at different levels of the system is essential for its
operation. But what is happening at each level may be thought of
as a different kind.
It may be helpful to place my thinking as a computational
neuroscientist in a broader context. First, I argue here that cause
and effect operate within a level of explanation, and not between
the levels. That sidesteps problems of how the mind affects
the brain (and vice versa), which involves issues of causality,
and which has puzzled philosophers since Descartes (Bennett,
2007; Kim, 2011). It also leads to a position on the exclusion
principle, which is that no effect has more than one sufficient
cause unless it is overdetermined (Bennett, 2007; Kim, 2011).
This principle has led to problems about mind-brain relations,
for the question arises about whether mental events might
be caused by mental events, and by brain activity, a physical
event (Bennett, 2007; Kim, 2011). I argue that causality can
be thought of as operating within each level of operation, and
that causality in terms of computational neuroscience needs
to be understood as operating within each of many different
levels of explanation. Further, the presence of multiple routes to
action which I have described in detail elsewhere (Rolls, 2014,
2020, 2021b) provides evidence that we need to know exactly
which route to action was involved for a particular behavior:
it is not sufficient to describe behavior as having inputs and
outputs (Kim, 2011). The computations in between the input
and output can be multiple, and even occurring at the same
time, in parallel, in the brain (Rolls, 2021b). Second, I argue
that different mental events are completely distinguishable by
different neuronal events. The neuron-level events that use a
sparse distributed representation across neurons are capable of
encoding a large amount of information relevant to mental states
(Rolls and Treves, 2011; Rolls, 2021b). Third, the brain is not
just a syntactic processor: its neurons which are involved in
brain computations convey by their firing rate specific content
about the world, as shown by information theoretic analyses,
and by the evidence that particular behavioral functions are
impaired by damage to particular parts of the brain (Rolls and
Treves, 2011; Rolls, 2021b). Indeed, each brain region provides a
representation of different content (Rolls, 2021b). For example,
some neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex respond to pleasant
touch on the forearm produced by a slow gentle rub that is
conveyed by C-tactile fibers (Rolls et al., 2003; McCabe et al.,
2008; Rolls, 2010, 2016a; Olausson et al., 2016). Another set of
C afferents respond to painful stimuli, and activates other parts
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of the orbitofrontal cortex (Rolls et al., 2003; Rolls, 2021b). The
orbitofrontal cortex is causally involved in the emotion-related
or affective sensations, which are impaired by damage to the
orbitofrontal cortex (Hornak et al., 2003; Rolls, 2019). This point
about content is an argument against Searle’s Chinese Room
simile (Searle, 1982, 1990). Fourth, in assessing what mental states
are possible, and are occurring, in a particular individual, we
need to know what all the computational modules are that are
involved, and how they operate, and what content is represented
by their neuronal firing, to know whether the mental states
are the same. The Turing test (Kim, 2011) is too behaviorist,
as it is difficult to adequately ask questions that will assess all
of the possible computational modules in the brain that are
active together with their content when a particular behavioral
output is produced.
The solution for me to know whether mental states are
similar in different individuals is to know from neuroscience
what the nature of each of the computational modules is in
the relevant brain, and what their content is during a particular
mental operation (Rolls, 2021b). The Turing test in principle
may be useful, but in practice is not an easy way to know
what mental events are taking place during a particular type of
behavior in the individual. Instead, knowledge of the detailed
computational architecture of the individual [e.g. whether the
individual is capable of higher order syntactic thoughts (HOSTs),
and what their contents are (Rolls, 2020)] is necessary in order
to evaluate the mental states of different individuals, and how
similar or not they may be. The brain/mental computational
approach is thus the only approach that I think will suffice to
elucidate questions such as whether two minds are similar or
not, and whether the mental states that are involved, including
phenomenal consciousness (Rolls, 2020), are similar or not.
We need to know what computations are being performed by
different brain regions; and then we will have a sound foundation
for understanding mental states and how they require underlying
brain states in particular computational modules with particular
contents (Rolls, 2020, 2021b).
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
A summary of my theory of the relation between the mind and
the brain is shown in Figure 1, for comparison with different
views (Baumgartner, 2009; Woodward, 2015; Dijkstra and De
Bruin, 2016). Physical brain states P1 and P2 are causally related
such that P1 causes P2 at a later time. This is indicated by a
directed arrow in Figure 1. Mental state M1 is supervenient on P1
in a non-causal relationship. A property of this supervenience is
that a set of properties M1 supervenes upon another set P1 just in
case no two things can differ with respect to M-properties without
also differing with respect to their P-properties (McLaughlin and
Bennett, 2011). Another property of my supervenience is that
there is no time delay between P1 and M1, consistent with no
causal relationship. Another property is that we can say that
P1 is sub-convenient on M1: the relation applies both upward
and downward between my different levels of explanation P and
M. Similarly, mental state M2 is supervenient on P2 in a non-
causal relationship. My suggestion is that causality can also be
considered to operate between M1 and M2, again across time.
My suggestion further is that because causality does not operate
between different levels of explanation, it does not make sense
to talk about M1 causing P2, or, for that matter, P1 causing M2.
This is different to earlier views (Baumgartner, 2009; Kim, 2011;
Woodward, 2015; Dijkstra and De Bruin, 2016).
What are the implications for dualist approaches to the mind
and the brain? I argue that mental events are different in kind
to their physical implementation. In a somewhat similar way, the
program implemented in a computer, for example computing the
square of a number, is different in kind to the currents flowing
into the logic gates in a computer central processing unit. But
I do not propose that mental events cause physical events, or
vice versa: in my thinking, the causality operates within but not
between levels. That avoids all the issues that arise if one tries
to argue in a dualist system about how mental events cause
physical events. In relation to the hard problem of phenomenal
consciousness, I argue that this arises when a particular type of
computation is being performed, HOSTs which can be used to
correct first order syntactic thoughts (Rolls, 2004, 2012b, 2020).
The implications for psychiatry of the approach described
here appear to be as follows. A treatment with medication of
brain states can be considered as a cause (the medication) having
effects on brain states by altering, for example, the effects of
neurotransmitters. We can then say that at the same time as the
brain states change, there are supervenient changes in mental
states. The implication of the supervenience is that it is non-
causal, but that the mental states are happening at a different
level of explanation, with the mental states so closely linked to the
brain states that a change in the brain states will be associated with
changes in the mental states. This approach helps reconciliation
of the concepts that mental states are different in kind from brain
states; that mental states happen at the same time as brain states;
and that the nature of the link is that mental and brain states are
different levels of explanation.
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